**Global Financial Stability Report** 

## **NBFI VULNERABILITIES AMID TIGHTER FINANCIAL CONDITIONS**

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• Growing vulnerabilities in NBFIs since the global financial crisis may amplify financial strains

- Extent & pace of global monetary tightening to tackle decades-high inflation may have unintended consequences for financial markets
- The chapter discusses:
  - > Challenges in monitoring these vulnerabilities (e.g., data gaps)
  - > NBFI vulnerabilities related to leverage, liquidity and interconnectedness
  - Case studies to illustrate the interaction of NBFI vulnerabilities
  - > Policy challenges & tradeoffs (price and financial stability) in the high-inflation environment

# **Regulatory Data Gaps**

NBFI (GFA)	Financial Leverage	Liquidity	Interconnectedness	Currency Mismatches
Investment funds (excluding money market funds and hedge funds) (\$58 trillion, 12% of GFA)				
Insurance companies (\$40 trillion, 9% of GFA)				
Pension funds (\$43 trillion, 9% of GFA)				
Money market funds (\$8.5 trillion, 2% of GFA)	N/A			N/A
Structured finance vehicles (\$6 trillion, 1% of GFA)				
Hedge funds (\$6 trillion, 1% of GFA)				
CCPs (\$0.7 trillion, 0.1% of GFA)	N/A			N/A



Other financials, such as banks and NBFIs, take on more leverage than others

#### Proxy For Derivatives-Based Leverage by Counterparty

(Notional amount to gross market value)



Hedge fund leverage can vary greatly by investment strategy

Hedge Fund Derivatives-Based Leverage (Gross notional exposure to NAV) New CLOs have a larger equity cushion than pre-GFC

#### Average US and European CLO Liabilities, by Type and Credit Rating (Percent)



Liquidity mismatches in open-ended funds have been increasing again...

#### Asset-Level Vulnerability Due to Funds' Illiquidity for Different Asset Types (Median, index value)

1.7 - — Corporate bonds — High-yield corporate bonds — High-yield sovereign bonds 1.4 -EM equities - EM bonds Small-cap equities 1.1 -0.8 0.5 0.2 20 21 22 2015 16 17 18 19

...against a backdrop of deteriorating market liquidity

Liquidity

#### Median Bid-Ask Spreads on Government Bonds (Percent)



Interconnectedness

In aggregate, OFI funding has shifted away from banks Procyclicality: Outflows from EM bond funds have been higher than other assets during stress events

#### **Historical Estimates of Fund Outflows EM Bond Fund Outflows and Aggregate Source of Funding for OFIs** Following a Five Percent Fall in Monthly **Changes in Net Asset Values** (Percent of OFI assets) Fund Returns (Percent of AUM) (Percent) From banks From insurers 0.0 From OFIs From pension funds values = 0.5524x - 0.002710 ---0.2 asset 8 ---0.4 6 ---0.6 change --0.8 4 – -6-Percent All episodes --1.02 - Sell-off episodes -1.2AE 0 -AE equity EM equity AE CRE funds EM bond -2 -4 -3 3 2007 2017 2021 government corporate Flow as a percent of assets under management bonds bonds



- LDI Stress in the UK, Could it Happen Elsewhere?
- Stress in Korean Local Debt Markets
- Commodity Trading Firms and Derivative Markets
- Private Debt and Structured Finance: Hidden Leverage and Interconnectedness

## LDI Stress in the UK: Could It Happen Elsewhere?



## **Stress in Korean Local Debt Markets**

Financial stress spiked and conditions remain tight in money market instruments

Korean Three-Month Money Market Spreads (Bps, spread to BoK's monetary stabilization bonds)



NBFIs have a sizable exposure to real estate project finance loans relative to their own capital

#### Financial Institution's Exposure to Real Estate Project Finance Loans (Percent of capital)



## **Policy Issues: Tension Between Objectives**

#### Decades-high inflation is generating tensions between price and financial stability objectives

- In a low inflation environment, CBs could simply ease monetary policy in response to financial stress
- With high inflation, CBs may have to continue to tighten monetary policy aggressively even if this may generate financial stability risks

### NBFIs may be exposed to and amplify tightening of financial conditions

- Especially those with significant liquidity and maturity mismatches, credit exposures, and FX mismatches
- Strategies implemented for "lower-for-long" may backfire—use of financial leverage predicated on low vol
- Extent of interconnectedness (NBFIs & banks) may result in spillovers to broader financial system
- EMs may face an intensification of cross-border portfolio outflows
- Data gaps (on positions/portfolios /interconnectedness) handicap surveillance and risk management

# **Robust Surveillance, Regulation and Supervision of NBFIs Are Vital**

- Plugging data gaps; system-wide stress testing; stress testing of NBFI sub-sectors with high systemic risks
- > Improving liquidity mismatch assessments and reducing liquidity mismatches in the long run
- Improving leverage disclosures and consistency in measurement;
- > NBFI-level stress testing for liquidity & leverage risks

#### • Cross-border issues

- Strengthen cross-border regulatory cooperation; global standard setters can play an important role
- Regulators should not lower standards in a race to the bottom to attract businesses

# **Using Additional CB Liquidity Tools May Improve Tradeoffs**

**Discretionary marketwide operations:** temporary and targeted to those NBFI segments with most adverse financial stability implications. Designed to restore market functioning while containing moral hazard.

The timing of a marketwide operation is critical: data-driven metrics trigger the potential intervention, while policymakers ultimately retain the discretion as to whether to intervene.

Access to standing lending facilities could be granted to reduce spillovers to the financial system, although the bar for such access should be very high to avoid moral hazard. No access without appropriate Reg & Sup.

**LoLR access:** if a systemic NBFI comes under stress. Lending to a systemic NBFI should be at the discretion of the CB, at a penal rate, fully collateralized, and accompanied by more oversight. A clear timeline should be established for restoring the liquidity of the institution.